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Counterterrorism detention policy in the United States is a mess.  
Commentators on both sides of the political spectrum have decried the U.S. 
approach.  Those on the left have criticized the arbitrary and unfair nature 
of U.S. policy;1 they argue that detention policy has unfairly trampled on 
the rights of individuals, producing results that are inconsistent and, 
perhaps, counterproductive, especially in the eyes of U.S. allies and the 
Muslim world.  Others have approached this question from a security 
perspective, decrying the granting of privileges to those who fail to follow 
the rules of civilized nations yet then demand the protection of those 
nation’s rules upon capture.2
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  With sincere 
thanks to the Symposium Editors at Northwestern, especially Charles Devore and Jonathan 
Sabo. 
  Those critics argue that our detention policies 
have unnecessarily endangered American security and must be toughened.  
Regardless of which argument is correct, both sides seem to agree that the 
status quo is untenable.  In light of the critiques, what accounts for the lack 
of reform?  One way of understanding the dysfunction inherent in detention 
policy is by seeing detention policy as a fixed policy domain mired in the 
status quo.  Policy advocates have created an information-induced 
equilibrium where the costs of reform exceed the benefits of the status quo.  
The status quo is characterized by (1) a hyper-political discourse about 
counterterrorism detention policy that has led to (2) the elevation of politics 
over policy and (3) questions about the legitimacy of counterterrorism 
detention.  When these factors are coupled with uncertainty about what 
1 See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS 
LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases 
in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1005, 1006–07 (2007) (citing other prominent critics such as Bruce Ackerman, Neal 
Katyal, and Harold Koh).   
2 JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AFTER 9/11 (2005); see also Pushaw, supra note 1. 
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change might entail, the status quo becomes a powerful force, characterized 
by a lack of focused attention to issues, and an inability to justify change.  
In this Article, I will first analyze the policy discourse surrounding 
detention policy.  Next, I will describe the current state of affairs in 
detention policy, describing the uncertainty in the system and the calls for 
reform.  Finally, I will make the case for pessimism, arguing that reform is 
unlikely due to the polarized nature of the counterterrorism detention policy 
debate and the strength of the status quo. 
II. BETWEEN POLICY DISCOURSE AND PARTISAN ARGUMENTS 
A. STATUS QUO INDUCING ARGUMENTS ABOUT COUNTERTERRORISM 
DETENTION 
To understand the status quo in counterterrorism detention, one must 
first understand the hyper-political discourse that surrounds 
counterterrorism detention policies.  This discourse will be a substantial 
challenge for advocates looking to reform the current system.  It is 
instructive to consider some of the ways in which interest groups have sown 
doubt about the merits and costs of counterterrorism detention; this subpart 
will summarize some of the most common critiques of counterterrorism 
detention.   
One frequently used tactic used by critics of preventive detention was 
to delegitimize detention facilities such as Guantanamo, by depicting them 
as cage prisons.3  In fact, human rights groups used the photos of “cages” 
used in Guantanamo as a tool to describe the Guantanamo detention facility 
as an inhumane place to detain people.  I say the photos were used as a tool 
because those photos depicted temporary facilities that were closed shortly 
after the Guantanamo detention facility was opened.  Donald Rumsfeld, 
during his tenure as Secretary of Defense noted that Camp X-Ray (the 
facility frequently featured in the cage critiques) was overgrown with six-
foot-tall weeds, yet the imagery persisted, as did the myth of Guantanamo 
as a facility where men were caged as animals.4
 
3 See, e.g., ANDY WORTHINGTON, THE GUANTANAMO FILES: THE STORIES OF THE 774 
DETAINEES IN AMERICA'S ILLEGAL PRISON (2007); CAGE PRISONERS, 
http://www.cageprisoners.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); cf. Jan Crawford Greenburg, 
Closing Gitmo May Be Just the Beginning, ABC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/President44/story?id=6461062&page=1 (explaining how 
Guantanamo began as an open air facility and is now a modern prison and Camp X-Ray is 
now overgrown with weeds).   
  With that said, the hyper-
4 See Morris Davis, In Defense of Guantanamo Bay, 117 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 2 (2007) 
(“Overgrown with weeds, Camp X-Ray was only inhabited by banana rats and iguanas when 
I first saw it in January 2006.  Nonetheless, to this day news stories about Guantanamo Bay 
frequently contain pictures of detainees in Camp X-Ray, even though it was abandoned more 
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political discourse surrounding detention policy is not limited to rights 
groups; Secretary Rumsfeld was just as guilty of committing this offense 
when he described the detainees in Guantanamo as the worst of the worst, 
an assertion that has been largely disproven.5
Another frequent assertion made by advocates and scholars, without 
any real factual support is that Guantanamo and other detention facilities 




than five years ago.”).  Davis wrote his article in 2007, five years after Camp X-Ray was 
closed.  Camp X-Ray was closed in April of 2002.  See JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO, 
TIMELINE (2011), available at www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/index/Fact Sheets/
TIMELINE.pdf. 
  This assertion is a key element in the 
campaign to delegitimize and sow doubt about the status quo.  This is 
presumably part of an effort to undermine the chances that the status quo 
becomes a permanent legislatively fixed policy option (as opposed to its 
current ad hoc form which may eventually fall into desuetude).  The 
assertions by legal scholars making these claims fall into three categories: 
(1) legal scholars that claim that general civil liberties violations (including 
the use of preventive detention) committed in counterterrorism operations 
implicitly aid terrorist recruitment; (2) legal scholars that specifically argue 
that Guantanamo functions as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda; and (3) legal 
scholars that only allude to the fact, but do not argue that counterterrorism 
detention serves as a recruiting tool. 
5 KAREN J. GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 41–
42 (2010); see also BENJAMIN WITTES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, DETENTION AND DENIAL: 
THE CASE FOR CANDOR AFTER GUANTANAMO 8 (2011) see also Katharine Q. Seelye, The 
Detainees; Some Guantánamo Prisoners Will Be Freed, Rumsfeld Says, NY TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2002, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/23/world/threats-responses-
detainees-some guantanamo-prisoners-will-be-freed-rumsfeld.html.  
6 See Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 
451 n.85 (2010) (citing BARACK OBAMA CAMPAIGN 2008, THE WAR WE NEED TO WIN):  
Guantánamo has become a recruiting tool for our enemies.  The legal framework behind 
Guantánamo has failed completely, resulting in only one conviction.  President Bush’s own 
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, wants to close it.  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
wants to close it.  The first step to reclaiming America’s standing in the world has to be closing 
this facility.  As president, Barack Obama will close the detention facility at Guantánamo.  He 
will reject the Military Commissions Act, which allowed the U.S. to circumvent Geneva 
Conventions in the handling of detainees.  He will develop a fair and thorough process based on 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice to distinguish between those prisoners who should be 
prosecuted for their crimes, those who can’t be prosecuted but who can be held in a manner 
consistent with the laws of war, and those who should be released or transferred to their home 
countries. 
See also Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model for Command 
Responsibility, 47 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 25, 26 (2010) (“The reports and pictorial evidence 
graphically documenting abuses by American troops against Muslim detainees were the best 
recruiting tool our enemies could have hoped for.”). 
858 GREGORY S. MCNEAL [Vol. 101 
First, those who claim but decline to directly state that 
counterterrorism detention serves as a recruiting tool argue that general 
violations of civil liberties, similar to what they assert happened in 
Guantanamo (e.g., torture during preventive detention), can lead to terrorist 
recruitment.  Those that make this claim say: (1) “torture produces more 
terrorists” because terrorist recruitment thrives on America’s abandonment 
of human rights values;7 (2) history shows that “Arab/Muslim prisons, 
particularly their torture chambers have served as incubators for generations 
of jihadis”;8 (3) and al Qaeda recruits by playing on the image of an 
underdog or “demonizing enemy states as forceful”;9 and (4) the photos of 
the human rights abuses of Abu Ghraib10 likely spurred otherwise neutral 
individuals to feel motivated to “lead a life of terror” in retaliation for those 
abuses.11
Second, there are various scholars who claim that Guantanamo 
(perhaps the most prominent example of U.S. detention policy) is 
specifically a recruiting tool, and thus bad policy.  Those who make that 
claim say: (1) violent Muslim reaction to the Newsweek story about a Koran 
  All of these arguments can be connected to the idea of America’s 
counterterrorism policies generally and counterterrorism detention 
specifically (Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib) serving as a recruiting tool.  
These authors do not cite direct evidence of the problems associated with 
counterterrorism detention, yet nonetheless the allegations sow doubt about 
whether the status quo policies should be permanently memorialized in law. 
 
7 Timothy K. Kuhner, The Corruption of Civilizations, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
349, 363 (2008).  “But we must also recognize it to be pragmatically important, given that 
terrorist recruitment thrives on our abandonment of our own values and on the reasonable 
perceptions of U.S. foreign relations impropriety that follow.”  Id. at 371. 
8 Id. at 363. 
9 See Megan Anne Healy, Comment, How the Legal Regimes of the European Union and 
the United States Approach Islamic Terrorist Web Sites: A Comparative Analysis, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 165, 170 (2009). 
10 One photo showed the battered face of a deceased prisoner.  See Atif Rehman, Note, 
The Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 493, 511–12 (2006).  Another photo 
was of the bloodied body of a dead prisoner wrapped in cellophane packed in ice.  Id. at 512.  
There are still more photographs and videos that exist that are not released to the public.  Id. 
11 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Lesser Evils’ in the War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
335, 347 (2004). 
Many observers suggest that the Abu Ghraib photos were the best terrorist recruitment tool 
possible.  Whether that is true or not, I don’t know.  But I think it is fair to say that Abu Ghraib 
increased the risk that a greater number of previously unmotivated individuals now feel 
motivated to lead a life of terror . . . .  There are situations where diligently respecting rights—in 
other words fighting with one hand tied behind one’s back—may in fact enhance one’s ability to 
fight by diminishing the will, appeal, frenzy, and recruitment of the enemy. 
Id. 
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being flushed down the toilet point to evidence of terrorist recruitment;12 (2) 
Guantanamo as an image of civil rights violations such as prolonged 
detention or torture serves as a terrorist recruiting tool because it incites 
Muslims worldwide to act against the U.S. in revenge;13 (3) Guantanamo is 
highlighted in terrorist recruitment websites, which serves as evidence of 
the United States “losing the moral high ground” and “[generating] the 
resentment which is the key to building the next generation of terrorists”;14
 
12 See William T. Hennessy, Willful and Outrageous Acts of Personal Abuse—Now OK 
for the CIA?, 57 NAVAL L. REV. 203, 235 (2009) (stating that the military is rightfully 
concerned that stories such as the Newsweek published story about a Koran being thrown in 
a toilet at Guantanamo Bay serve as unnecessary fuel for the insurgents’ propaganda mill, 
which will result in increased terrorist recruitment). 
 
(4) Guantanamo detention functions as a greater tool for terrorist 
recruitment than detention in Afghanistan or Iraq because transferring 
members of the “insurgency is likely to spread grievances across 
13 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Institutionalization of Torture Under the Bush 
Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 424 (2006) (“[E]ach person tortured, as 
well as his/her family, are likely to become enemies of the U.S. and seek revenge for their 
treatment, thus generating more potential enemies likely to threaten the security of this 
country and its people.”); Douglass Cassel, Liberty, Judicial Review, and the Rule of Law at 
Guantanamo: A Battle Half Won, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 44–45 (2008) (“[I]ndefinite 
detentions at Guantanamo . . . [enrage] Muslims worldwide, generating far more recruits for 
the ‘radical Islamists’ than any plausible number of enemy combatants likely to be set free 
by habeas.”); Mohamed R. Hassanien, International Law Fights Terrorism in the Muslim 
World: A Middle Eastern Perspective, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 245 (2008) 
(“These generations would be living in crowded mega cities and will become attractive 
recruits for radical groups . . . [and] will grow up angry and will seek someone to blame, in a 
political atmosphere in which their impressions of the U.S. will be largely shaped by Abu 
Ghraib and Guantanamo photos or stories.”); Michael P. O’Connor & Celia M. Rumann, 
Fanning the Flames of Hatred: Torture, Targeting and Support for Terrorism, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 633, 664 (2009) (“[A]l Qaeda used ‘the fact that we torture people to recruit 
new members, and then we’re going to have to deal with a whole new wave of terrorists.’  It 
is this mechanism—recruitment based upon the outrage sparked by Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo—that has resulted in perhaps 80–90% of the foreign fighters coming to Iraq to 
kill Americans in suicide bombings and other attacks.”); Jordan J. Paust, Serial War Crimes 
in Response to Terrorism Can Pose Threats to National Security, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
5201, 5214 (2009) (noting that a serial war crimes governmental policy such as a common 
plan to use unlawful coercive interrogation “undoubtedly . . . served as a terrorist recruitment 
tool”); Symposium, Supreme Court Panel: Discussion & Commentary, 21 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 385, 391–92 (2009) (“[Al Qaeda’s] recruits are fungible.  An endless stream of people 
remain willing to sign up, so you want to marginalize them in their societies.  If you read the 
transcripts of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s combatant status review tribunal hearing down at 
Guantanamo . . . plays totally into [al Qaeda’s] narrative.”). 
14 Kenneth Roth, Why the Current Approach to Fighting Terrorism Is Making Us Less 
Safe, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 591 (2008) (“If you look at the terrorist recruiting 
websites . . . they highlight Guantanamo, they highlight Abu Ghraib . . . .  When the Bush 
message is less attractive than the message of the terrorist recruiter, we are losing the fight 
against terrorism and that is very much what is happening.”). 
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geographic jurisdictions,”15 and therefore insurgents should be detained and 
prosecuted in the local area in which they were captured because it 
centralizes the grievance and limits the ability to link to the global 
insurgency;16
For example, one article cites Dennis Blair, when he was nominee for 
Director of National Intelligence, testifying that Guantanamo is “a rallying 
cry for terrorist recruitment.”
 and (5) Guantanamo is understood explicitly and implicitly as 
a terrorist recruiting tool by policy makers and the international community.  
17  Another article references the U.N. General 
Assembly’s adoption on September 20, 2006 of the United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which recognized “conditions conducive to the 
spread of terrorism” to include “dehumanization of victims of terrorism in 
all its forms and manifestations.”18  These direct assertions about 
counterterrorism detention as a recruiting tool are mirror images of the 
efforts by human rights groups to undermine the creation of a permanent 
preventive detention regime.  While Guantanamo has been the focus of 
human rights groups for the past nine years, their focus is not just on the 
closure of Guantanamo but also an end to preventive detention.19
 
15 Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1818 (2009) (“[T]he capture, detention, and prosecution of insurgents are 
potential grievances insurgents can use to attract new recruits or motivate existing 
insurgents . . . .  Guantánamo is an example.  Detention policies in Afghanistan and Iraq 
spark little backlash or protest compared to Guantánamo, and a global insurgency analysis 
would predict that Guantánamo might inspire more terrorist than it holds.”). 
  What we 
have witnessed in their campaign against Guantanamo is a mirror image of 
16 Id. 
17 Devon Chaffee, The Cost of Indefinitely Kicking the Can: Why Continued 
“Prolonged” Detention Is No Solution To Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 187, 
189–90 (2009). 
18 See United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, Annex, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288, at 4 (Sept. 20, 2006); see also Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61/171, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/171 (Mar. 1, 2007).  “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat 
terrorism complies with their obligations under international law, in particular international 
human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.”  Id. at 2.  “[I]t is imperative that all States 
work to uphold and protect the dignity of individuals and their fundamental freedoms, as 
well as democratic practices and the rule of law, while countering terrorism.”  Id. at 3.  
Implicit in U.N. Resolution 61/171 is the recognition that violations of human rights, 
humanitarian law, and the rule of law can exacerbate the fight against terrorism.  See Paust, 
supra note 13, at 5213–14. 
19 See Suzanne Ito, Preventive Detention Must Be Repudiated and Overturned, ACLU 
(Jan. 5, 2009, 6:33 PM), http://www.aclu.org/2009/01/05/preventive-detention-must-be-
repudiated-and-overturned (describing ACLU’s efforts to overturn preventive detention writ 
large, not just close Guantanamo); see also David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive 
Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (2009); David Glazier, 
Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
957 (2009). 
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the campaign they will mount against any changes that will make 
permanent a preventive detention regime.20
The final example of status quo inducing partisan discourse in the form 
of scholars and other advocates sowing doubt about Guantanamo 
specifically and preventive detention more generally is the category of 
authors who tangentially suggest that Guantanamo and preventive detention 
serves as a recruiting tool.  Again, these scholars raise the argument but 
offer little empirical support.  Nonetheless, they are successful in sowing 
doubt about the costs associated with a preventive detention regime.  For 
example, one article considered the circumstances under which members of 
the Muslim-American community would voluntarily cooperate with police 
efforts to combat terrorism; in the process of gathering respondents’ 
evaluation of current foreign and national security policy issues, the study 
assumed that the Guantanamo detentions played a significant role in al 
Qaeda propaganda.
 
21  The author did not primarily argue that Guantanamo 
or preventive detention is a recruiting tool for al Qaeda; rather the author 
accepted the argument as a fact, something that appears to be common 
within the anti-preventive detention policy community.22
Furthermore, many advocacy groups essentially claim: 
(1) Guantanamo symbolizes abuse of Muslim prisoners and serves to spur 





20 See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Civil Liberties Groups Oppose Obama’s Plan to Close 
Guantanamo, Absent Serious Changes, WASH. INDEPENDENT (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:51 PM), 
http://washingtonindependent.com/81679/civil-liberties-groups-oppose-obamas-plan-to-
close-gitmo-absent-serious-changes.  
 and (2) the existence of Guantanamo allowed U.S. policy to be 
21 Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects 
in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365, 
378 (2010). 
22 See infra notes 130–134 (providing websites of human rights groups). 
23 See, e.g., KENNETH ROTH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2007, at 7 (2007) 
(“[A]buses committed in the name of counterterrorism, [such as what happened in 
Guantanamo,] have only aggravated the terrorist threat.  The use of torture and arbitrary 
detention spurs terrorist recruitment in communities that identify with the victims.”); John B. 
Bellinger III, Shayana Kadidal, Clifford D. May & William Yeomans, Should Guantanamo 
Bay Be Closed?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/
publication/21247/should_guantanamo_bay_be_closed.html (“[Guantanamo] has come to 
symbolize abuse of Muslim prisoners and serves as a powerful recruiting tool for al-
Qaeda . . . .  No doubt, al-Qaeda does utilize Guantanamo as a recruiting tool . . . .  
Guantanamo damaged our national security by tarnishing America’s standing in the world 
and serving as a powerful recruiting tool for terrorists . . . .  [Efforts to keep Guantanamo 
open] are tantamount to giving Al Qaeda a major propaganda victory, as there is little the 
organization would want more than to continue this recruiting and propaganda boon . . . .”); 
Eight Years After 9-11, NAT’L SEC. NETWORK (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.nsnetwork.org/
node/1404 (“[Obama’s] condemnation of torture, his pledge to close Guantanamo, and the 
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misconstrued as a war against Islam, which fits perfectly with bin Laden’s 
narrative of America’s contempt for Islam and Muslims.24  The American 
Civil Liberties Union even made a video of interviews with five former 
Guantanamo detainees detailing their experience there, which illustrate 
these two claims.25
To further corroborate the claim, advocacy groups cite to prominent 
political individuals, military figures, and distinguished journalists who all 
argue that Guantanamo was a major recruiting tool for al Qaeda: President 
Barack Obama, 2008 Republican presidential nominee Senator John 
McCain, Matthew Alexander—the pseudonym of the Air Force Major and 
interrogator who, without using torture, extracted information that led to 
finding Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora, and 
president of New America Foundation and two-time Pulitizer prize winner 
Steve Coll.  Obama based his conclusion off of intelligence that he sees as 
Commander-in-Chief.
 
26  In addition, terrorist expert R.P. Eddy recognized 
that Obama’s announcement to close Guantanamo hindered al Qaeda’s 
ability to recruit, which is substantiated by Ayman al-Zawahri’s confused, 
racially tinged attack on the Obama Administration.27
 
shutting down of secret prisons have weakened al-Qaeda’s recruiting ability and improved 
America’s image abroad.”). 
  McCain validated his 
stance by noting that an “al Qaeda operative in a prison camp in Iraq” told 
24 See, e.g., Stephen Flynn et al., Global War on Terror Series: The War on Terror—Are 
We Losing?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/ 
publication/9258/global_war_on_terror_series.html (“[Guantanamo confirms] bin Laden’s 
narrative . . . claims about America’s intentions, claims about American values, claims about 
America’s contempt for Islam and Muslim have been borne out.”); Daniel B. Prieto, 
Matthew C. Waxman & Robert McMahon, Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Prison Camp, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/18493/ 
closure_of_the_guantanamo_bay_ prison_camp.html (“[Guantanamo’s effects] had direct 
effects on our counterterrorism policies . . . in terms of serving as propaganda and an active 
recruitment tool for terrorists and really inflaming public opinions around the world . . . .  
[Guantanamo] also served as an easy aid for recruitment and also served to misconstrue—or 
allow U.S. policy to be misconstrued as a war against Islam.”). 
25 See Andrew Sullivan, Justice Denied: Former Detainees Speak Out, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
3, 2009, 2:19 PM), http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/11/ 
former-detainees-speak-out.html. 
26 See John Aloysius Farrell, Obama Defends Guantanamo Decisions, GLOBALPOST 
(May 21, 2009, 2:54 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/notebook/diplomacy/090521/ 
obama-defends-guantanamo-decisions. 
27 See Experts: Al Qaeda Tape Demonstrates that It Feels Threatened by Obama Victory, 
NAT’L SECURITY NETWORK (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1068 (“Al 
Qaeda recognizes that the promise of the Obama administration has already increased global 
goodwill and thereby undermines al Qaeda’s extremist message and efforts to fundraise and 
recruit.”).  
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him this information.28  Alexander supported his remarks because he heard 
first hand from freedom fighters and Sunni Iraqis that Guantanamo was the 
number one reason they had decided to join al Qaeda.29  Mora supported his 
belief with testimony from U.S. flag-rank officers claiming that 
Guantanamo was one of the main reasons why insurgent fighters joined al 
Qaeda and subsequently caused U.S. combat deaths in Iraq.30  When 
testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, Steve Coll claimed 
that in order to undermine al Qaeda’s efforts “to reconnect to its former 
political, financial, and recruiting support,” the U.S. should, among other 
things, “[close] Guantanamo.”31
The narratives described above are repeated by the media, further 
sowing doubts about the merits of preventive detention.  For the most part, 
the media serves as an echo chamber for the scholarly and think tank 
community, making similar references and similar arguments.  They 
essentially claim that Guantanamo and preventive detention (1) currently 
acts as a “centerpiece” in al Qaeda’s war against America;
 
32 (2) serves as 
rallying symbol of cruelty for insurgent fighters to join al Qaeda;33
 
28 See Cheney on the Fringe, NAT’L SECURITY NETWORK (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1400 (“I think that these [enhanced] interrogations, once 
publicized, helped al Qaeda recruit.  I got that from an al Qaeda operative in a prison camp 
in Iraq who told me that.”). 
 and (3) 
29 See Conservatives Attack America’s Legal System, NAT’L SECURITY NETWORK (Nov. 
16, 2009), http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1467 (“I listened time and time again to foreign 
fighters, and Sunni Iraqis, state that the number one reason they had decided to pick up arms 
and join Al Qaeda was the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the authorized torture and abuse at 
Guantanamo Bay . . . .  Consequently it is clear that at least hundreds but more likely 
thousands of American lives (not to count Iraqi civilian deaths) are linked directly to the 
policy decisions to introduce the torture and abuse of prisoners as accepted tactics.”). 
30 See Guantanamo Bay Must Be Closed to Keep America Safe, NAT’L SECURITY 
NETWORK (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1507 (“Serving U.S. flag rank 
officers . . . maintain that the first and second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in 
Iraq—as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat—are, 
respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.”). 
31 See Steve Coll, House Testimony: The Paradoxes of Al Qaeda, NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/01/house-testimony-the-
paradoxes-of-al-qaeda.html (providing Coll’s testimony before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Armed Services Committee). 
32 See James Gordon Meek, Gitmo Fades As ‘Recruiting Tool for Al Qaeda, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dc/2010/01/gitmo-
fades-as-recruiting-tool.html (“‘It’s not quite as front and center as it was during the Bush 
administration,’ said Flashpoint Intelligence terror expert Evan Kohlmann.  ‘But Gitmo is 
still a centerpiece in Al Qaeda’s argument that nothing has changed in the U.S. since 
Obama’s election.’”). 
33 See, e.g., Matthew Alexander, Torture’s the Wrong Answer.  There’s a Smarter Way, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2008, at B01 (“I learned in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters 
flocked there to fight [for al Qaeda] were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and 
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drives those “undecided into the arms of the enemy.”34  One article gives 
hard figures, noting that Guantanamo and other counterterrorism detention 
facilities were used as a recruiting tool as many as thirty-two times since 
2001 and four times in 2010 alone.35  Another article wrote about Sarham 
Hassan Wisme, an Iraqi individual testifying that his attacks of American 
soldiers and affiliation with al Qaeda was motivated by abuse of prisoners 
held in detention at Abu Ghraib.36
 
Guantanamo.  Our policy of torture were directly and swiftly recruiting fighters for al-Qaeda 
in Iraq.”); Editorial, The Torture Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A42 (“Alberto 
Mora . . . told the Senate committee that ‘there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who 
maintain that [main cause of] U.S. combat deaths in Iraq [was the result of] Guantanamo.”); 
Guantanamo’s Shadow, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2007, at 40, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamo-apos-s-shadow/6212/ 
(“Gitmo has become a symbol for cruelty and inhumanity that is repugnant to a wide sector 
of the world community and a powerful tool that al Qaeda can use to damage US interest and 
recruit others to its cause.”); Joshua Phillip, Guantanamo Detainees Will Be Moved to 
Illinois Prison, EPOCH TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A1, available at http://epoch-archive.com/
a1/en/us/sfo/2009/12-Dec/17/A1_200912117_NoCA-US.pdf (“According to [National 
Security Adviser James] Jones, ‘We think that by [moving Guantanamo detainees to a prison 
in Illinois], we are removing from terrorist organizations around the world a recruiting tool 
Guantanamo has come to symbolize.”); Julia Preston, Officials See Risk in the Release of 
Photos and Videotapes of Iraqi Prisoner Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A12 (“It is 
probable that Al Qaeda and other groups will seize upon these images and videos as grist for 
their propaganda mill, which will result in, besides violent attacks, increased terrorist 
recruitment . . . .”); Joby Warrick, To Combat Obama, Al-Qaeda Hurls Insults, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 25, 2009, at A01. 
 
34 See, e.g., Max Fisher, What We Can Learn from Saudi Intelligence, ATLANTIC, (Nov. 
1, 2010, 2:45 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/11/what-we-can-
learn-from-saudi-intelligence/65518/ (“Sending a suspected terrorist to Guantanamo or 
Bagram risks angering his community and inspiring even more militancy.”); Charles C. 
Krulak & Joseph P. Hoar, It’s Our Cage, Too, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at A17 (“The 
torture methods . . . have nurtured the recuperative power of the enemy.  The war will be 
won or lost not on the battlefields but in the minds of potential supporters who have not yet 
thrown in their lot with the enemy.  If we forfeit our values by signaling that they are 
negotiable in situations of grave or imminent danger, we drive those undecided into the arms 
of the enemy.”). 
35 See Meek, supra note 32 (“Thirty-two times since 2001 and four times this year alone, 
senior Al Qaida in recruiting videos have used the prison at Guantanamo Bay as a clarion 
call to bring extremists from around the world to join their efforts.”).  
36 See Thomas E. Ricks, The Insurgent Who Loved ‘Titanic,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/ 
AR2009020701198.html (“Sarhan boasted of having planted more than 200 bombs for 
attacks on U.S. troops. . . .  [Sarhan] had started attacking the Americans in the spring of 
2004, motivated by news of the American abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison west 
of Baghdad. . . .  In January 2007, [Sarhan] had affiliated with al Qaeda after hearing its 
local mufti speak about the need to unify because the Americans were retreating from 
Iraq . . . .”). 
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Numerous prominent policymakers, such as President Obama,37 House 
Representative Jane Harman,38 Senator Carl Levin,39 Attorney General Eric 
Holder,40 and former U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair41 
are all on record claiming that either Guantanamo, preventive detention, or 
Abu Ghraib acts as a recruiting tool for al Qaeda.  A memorandum made by 
the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General mentioned 
that Guantanamo was a tool used by al Qaeda “in spreading negative views 
of the United States,” though it was only a brief reference.42
 
37 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 
2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09) (“Meanwhile, instead of serving as a tool to 
counter terrorism, Guantanamo became a symbol that helped al Qaeda recruit terrorists to its 
cause.  Indeed, the existence of Guantanamo likely created more terrorists around the world 
than it ever detained.”). 
  In short, the 
political discourse surrounding preventive detention generally, and 
Guantanamo specifically, calls into question the prospects of reforming 
current counterterrorism detention policies by raising doubts about the 
merits of the status quo and any efforts to make current policies permanent. 
38 See President Barack Obama, Report to American People About Security Mistakes; 
Yemeni Threat Apparent (Jan. 9, 2010) (transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1001/09/sitroom.01.html) (“I think if we really want to do counterterrorism 
right, we have to eliminate one of Al Qaeda’s top recruiting tools, that’s Guantanamo Bay.”). 
39 See Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: The Origins of Aggressive 
Interrogation Techniques, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) available at 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=299242 (“[A]l Qaeda and Taliban terrorists 
are taught to expect Americans to abuse them.  They’re recruited based on false propaganda 
that says the United States is out to destroy Islam . . . .  The abuse at Abu Ghraib was a 
potent recruiting tool for al Qaeda and handed al Qaeda a propaganda weapon they could use 
to peddle their violent ideology.”). 
40 See Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks on the Closing of Guantanamo Bay (Apr. 
29, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ 
ag-speech-090429.html) (“Guantanamo has come to represent a time and an approach that 
we want to put behind us: a disregard for our centuries-long respect for the rule of law and a 
go-it alone approach that alienated our allies, incited our adversaries and ultimately 
weakened our fight against terrorism.”). 
41 See Nomination of Admiral Dennis Blair to be Director of National Intelligence: 
Hearing before S. Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Admiral 
Dennis C. Blair USN (Ret.)), available at http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/
20090122_testimony.pdf (“I agree with the President that the detention center at 
Guantanamo has become a damaging symbol to the world and that it must be closed.  It is a 
rallying cry for terrorist recruitment and harmful to our national security.”). 
42 OFFICE OF THE U.S. INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE 
FBI’S INVOLVEMENT IN AND OBSERVATION OF DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN GUANTANAMO 
BAY, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ 72 (2008), available at www.justice.gov/oig/special/
s0805/final.pdf (“[I]n addition to being ineffective and short-sighted, using [aggressive 
techniques implemented in Guantanamo] was wrong and helped al-Qaeda in spreading 
negative views of the United States.”). 
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Of course if only one side were heard in the debate over 
counterterrorism detention, we might see a change in policy that favored the 
goals of human rights groups.  But supporters of preventive detention and 
Guantanamo are equally vocal in their assertion that Guantanamo and 
preventive detention are not recruiting tools.  These counterarguments 
reinforce the status quo by bringing about an information-induced 
equilibrium, sowing doubt about whether weakening the current regime of 
counterterrorism detention is wise.   While no academic has written an 
article claiming that preventive detention or Guantanamo does not serve as 
a recruitment tool, many think tanks and commentators have. 
The main argument made by think tanks in support of preventive 
detention and in opposition to the notion that Guantanamo serves as a 
recruiting tool is that Guantanamo is rarely mentioned in the messages 
delivered by top al Qaeda leaders.  Assuming that the list of collected 
statements and interviews from top al Qaeda leaders are representative of al 
Qaeda’s recruiting propaganda,43 those past statements reveal that top al 
Qaeda officials rarely mention preventive detention or Guantanamo.44  
Moreover, even in the messages where Guantanamo is referenced, it is 
incorrectly conflated with Abu Ghraib45 (though this does not necessarily 
preclude the fact that preventive detention may act as a recruiting tool) and 
when mentioned it is mentioned very briefly.  For example, Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri, one of al Qaeda’s top strategists, gave a twelve-page statement 
entitled “Nine Years After the Start of the Crusader Campaign” with four 
pages devoted to Pakistan, two pages to Afghanistan, nearly two to Egypt, 
two to Palestinians, and two to al Qaeda’s prospects for victory.46
 
43 Advocates concede that there may be other messages not included in the sample and 
that collected statements and interviews from al Qaeda may only be partial translations.  See 
Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo Is Not Al Qaeda’s ‘Number One Recruitment Tool,’ WKLY. 
STANDARD (Dec. 27, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/gitmo-not-al-
qaedas-number-one-recruitment-tool_524997.html?page=1.  However, the advocates go on 
to say that it is safe to assume that what was recorded in the collected statements and 
interviews includes most of what “al Qaeda’s honchos have said publicly since January 
2009.”  Id. 
  In this 
44 See id.  The translations for the thirty-four messages are available at 
Translations/Transcriptions of Statements by al-Qaida Leadership, NINE ELEVEN FINDING 
ANSWERS (NEFA) FOUNDATION, http://nefafoundation.org/index.cfm?pageID=44 (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
45 See Benjamin Wittes, Dan Byman on Guantanamo as Recruitment Tool, LAWFARE 
(Dec. 28, 2010, 8:59 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/ 
dan-byman-on-guantanamo-as-recruitment-tool/. 
46 See Karl Rove, Gitmo Is Not a Recruiting Tool for Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 
2010, at A13.  The statement can be found at Zawahiri: 09.15.2010 Ayman al-Zawahiri Nine 
years After the Start of the Crusader Campaign, WORLD ANALYSIS (Sept. 15, 2010, 6:02 
AM), http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=1476.  
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same statement, only a single sentence mentioned how the Koran was 
desecrated in Guantanamo, Iraq, and elsewhere.47  In fact, a keyword search 
of all the messages by top al Qaeda leaders yielded only seven mentions of 
Guantanamo, while there are numerous more mentions of words like 
Israel/Israeli/Israelis (ninety-eight mentions), Jew/Jews (ninety-four 
mentions), Zionist(s) (ninety-four mentions), and other words that focus on 
the overall Zionist-Crusader conspiracy narrative against Muslims.48
The think tank message has not penetrated as deeply into media 
depictions of preventive detention as the opposition message has.  In fact 
there are few sources directly arguing that preventive detention is not a 
recruiting tool.  The only colorable argument could be that there will be no 
less recruiting by al Qaeda once Guantanamo is closed,
 
49
The political discourse over the merits of preventive detention and 
Guantanamo reinforces the status quo in counterterrorism detention policy.  
This is so because to bring about change, the first challenge is to convince 
policymakers that a problem is worthy of being addressed.  This means it 
would be worthy of a place on the policy agenda, including time dedicated 
to hearings, and the support of party leaders who will make decisions about 
what discussions will move from committee to a floor vote.  Overcoming 
the bias towards the status quo in counterterrorism detention requires 
overcoming substantial obstacles in a policy domain with few easy 
choices.
 which suggests 
that Guantanamo exclusively cannot be a major recruiting tool for al Qaeda 
if the next detention facility and its complete absence of civil liberties 
violations, would be denounced by al Qaeda in the same manner.  This 
notion reinforces the idea that a change from the status quo is unlikely if the 
new policy will face the same critiques as the status quo policies. 
50
 
47 See Rove, supra note 
 
46, at A13. 
48 See Joscelyn, supra note 98, at 1.  Other word mentions include: Palestine/Palestinian 
(200), Gaza (131), Crusader (322), Afghanistan (333), Iraq (157), Pakistan (331).  Id.  James 
Gordon Meek from the New York Daily obtained similar results: only fifty-eight out of 
hundreds of public statements and interviews between 2003 and 2009 contained references 
of al Qaeda griping about Guantanamo Bay.  See Rove, supra note 46, at A13.  
49 See Andrew Cohen, Charles and Umar Escape Guantanamo, ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 
2010, 7:55 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/01/ 
charles-and-umar-escape-guantanamo/33292/. 
50 See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO 
WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 247 (2009). 
The first threshold is to convince gatekeepers that a problem is worthy of being taken up . . . .  
[T]he push forward to hearings and serious consideration will often be stymied by the lack of 
available space on the agenda or by outright opposition by subcommittee and committee chairs.  
To pass through the next gate, advocates must gain the support of the party leaders who decide 
what advances out of committee to a floor vote.  Since this is Congress, every challenge is times 
two—two houses must advance legislation so that it may be enacted.  It is a process full of 
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The discussion above highlights that policymakers and the public are 
aware of the problems associated with preventive detention, the potential 
costs, and plausible solutions.  The reality is that shared information is 
pervasive in diffuse policy communities focused on these issues.51  Interest 
groups are commonly aware “of the facts and figures associated with the 
justification for the current policy, various proposals to change it, and 
research or experiences . . . suggesting how any policy changes might be 
implemented.”52
individual policymakers typically do not have the ability single-handedly to change 
the collective understandings of entire policy communities. . . .  [A] policy community 
is made up of experts, and they were not born yesterday; naïve is not the operating 
rule within Washington, after all.  A policy community, even if it is riven by deep 
divisions, provides the opportunity for experts to share common information and to 
develop common understandings of the shape, direction, and justifications of public 
policy.
  This aggregation of information, rather than prompting 
changes instead reinforces the status quo.  Why?  Because  
53
Expertise on counterterrorism detention is in abundance, and most of 
the expert opinions probably end up cancelling each other out, there is thus 
little impetus for movement away from the status quo policy in any 
direction (e.g., a more rights protective regime or a more security protective 
regime). 
   
B. WHAT IS U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION POLICY? 
In light of the preceding discussion of the political discourse 
surrounding counterterrorism detention, one may wonder how we can 
separate the rhetoric from the reality.  If the partisan discourse is stripped 
away, what is U.S. detention policy?  This seems like a simple question, but 
explaining counterterrorism detention policy may in fact be one of the most 
difficult quandaries in national security law and policy.  Unlike the question 
of what rules govern criminal arrests, there is no hornbook one can turn to 
for quick guidelines on what U.S. policy is or should be.  Thus, to explain 
U.S. policy, I will critically evaluate Detention and Denial: The Case for 
Candor After Guantanamo, which is the best case for detention reform in 
any scholarly publication.54
 
resistance.  Overcome the friction, and substantial policy change may follow, but it is not easy to 
overcome the high level of friction apparent in Washington policy making. 
  The book, authored by Ben Wittes of the 
Brookings Institution, explains how there is simply no comprehensible 
Id. 
51 Id. at 249 & ch.3. 
52 Id. at 250. 
53 Id. 
54 See generally WITTES, supra note 5. 
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policy behind U.S. counterterrorism detentions.  Detention is a thing the 
U.S. government does through a patchwork of existing authorities whose 
defining characteristic is incoherence:  
It is less a policy than a set of arrangements made in the absence of a policy.  And at 
the core of its incoherence is its attempt to deal with a complex policy problem in the 
absence of clear rules.  Nobody knows today exactly when it is legal to detain the 
enemy in counterterrorism operations, who counts as the enemy, what procedures the 
executive and courts must follow in evaluating detention cases, and what rights and 
protections the detainees must receive in the process.  All of this is in flux, with 
different answers proposed for different facilities, different legal regimes, and 
different detainees.  Uncertainty is the only sure thing.55
This is not to say there are no rules or boundaries delimiting this 
incoherence.  Rather, rules abound in counterterrorism detentions, but 
knowing which ones apply, when they apply, and how they apply are all 
open questions whose answers depend on location, context, and the whims 
of actors in the system. 
 
The failure of the American political system to engage seriously with 
the rules governing counterterrorism detention policy has placed the 
responsibility for defining those rules in the hands of foreign governments 
and unelected judges.56  Wittes argues that when foreign proxies are used to 
house detainees, the U.S. “delegates to those countries the power to define 
the permissible boundaries of U.S. national security detentions.  It 
relinquishes control over the conditions of confinement, and it also 
relinquishes control over the criteria for release.”57  Want to know what 
U.S. policy governs detentions in the U.S.-built Bagram prison?  Your 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request will need to be addressed to 
Kabul, not D.C.58
Things are no better when it comes to detentions closer to home.  
Which elected official should Joe Citizen hold responsible when a released 
Guantanamo detainee decides to attack a shopping mall in Peoria?  There is 
no identifiable, responsible person when judges are running the show.  
Instead detention of Guantanamo detainees, Wittes explains, is governed by 
the rules developed in the common law habeas process in the D.C. district 




55 Id. at 10, 32. 
  Wittes 
56 Id. at 59–60. 
57 Id. at 59. 
58 Peter Graff, Afghans Agree to Take Over U.S. Prison at Bagram, REUTERS NEWS (Jan. 
9, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/09/us-afghanistan-bagram-
idUSTRE6081IN20100109. 
59 See WITTES, supra note 5, at 60. 
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does not argue that judges are incapable of deciding detention cases,60 nor 
does he argue that they are incapable of making rules to govern their 
process—rather, his point is that obfuscation has delegated this role to 
parties that are more constrained, less visible, and less accountable than the 
nation’s political leadership.61
Of course, the notion that a released Guantanamo detainee may 
commit an act of terrorism is just an obvious, and perhaps unrealistic, cost 
of delegating to judges the responsibility for making rules regarding 
counterterrorism detentions.  The bigger cost, according to Wittes, is that 
when these judges interpret the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force (AUMF),
  If you are upset about that mall in Peoria, 
your letter should not be mailed to Congress or the White House; rather, 
you should mail it to a judge’s chambers in D.C. 
62 they are evaluating the substantive authority to detain the 
enemy, but “they also necessarily interpret the scope of the substantive 
authority to target the enemy, or, more generally, to wage war on the 
enemy.”63  Who may be targeted and captured by soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
and Marines on far off battlefields will be dictated less by the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief, Congress, or senior military leadership, and more by 
the developing case law governing a few dozen Guantanamo detainees.  
The fact that those cases mostly involved low-level Taliban members, that 
their cases were nearly a decade old, or that the evidence was not gathered 
with an eye towards habeas litigation under rules that would take years to 
develop, will not alter the binding nature of those precedents on current and 
future conflicts.64
 
60 See id. at 60 (“What the decision does mean is that for good or ill, the rules will be 
written by judges through the common law process of litigating habeas corpus cases of the 
detainees still held at Guantanamo.”).  Wittes comes close to criticizing the judges when he 
writes, “This body of law doesn’t look much like the law that a sensible political system 
would design.  Indeed, I would suggest that it serves the key interests of neither the detainees 
nor the government.”  Id. at 62.  
  The Executive Branch and Congress have refused to 
define the rules governing their conflict “and the result has been that a 
61 Id. at 91. 
62 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). 
63 WITTES, supra note 5, at 61. 
64 See id.  
[H]ow do we avoid repeating the bait-and-switch that we have engineered for ourselves?  How 
do we avoid capturing people and justifying their initial detention based on crude intelligence, 
imagining ourselves to be operating within a relatively conventional law-of-war framework, and 
then finding our allies, our courts, and our own consciences pushing us toward applying a much 
higher set of standards down the road? 
Id. at 120; cf. id. at 112–13 (“Those concerned primarily with security have no more reason 
to admire the current arrangements. . . .  The most they can honestly say for the system is 
that it does not necessarily mean more trouble than a big bait-and switch for a declining 
group of people at Guantanamo . . . .”). 
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diffuse set of actors have been groping their way toward rules in the 
absence of clear guidance and in the face of the need to decide large 
numbers of individual cases.”65
The system is also suboptimal for detainees, because while it puts 
“pressure on the government to resolve detainee cases in general, 
adjudications are not functioning quickly enough to matter to the vast 
majority of individual detainees.”
  This is, in a word, suboptimal.  It is 
amazing that the executive branch allows this judicially driven uncertainty 
to endure. 
66  Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit pointed 
out in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, only Guantanamo detainees get habeas review; 
the detainee at Bagram or anywhere else approximating the theater of 
conflict is not entitled to review.67  As Wittes notes, habeas is the only 
opportunity detainees have to challenge their detention, “[j]udges hear the 
initial case.  They rule, and if they rule against the detainee and the 
judgment withstands appeal, future detention reverts to purely a matter of 
executive discretion—forever.”68
“Who bears the burden of proof in these cases, and what is that 
burden—that is, who has to prove what?”
  It seems the system is at least consistent 
in its suboptimality, neither the government nor detainees seem to benefit 
from the status quo.  If a bias in favor of the status quo is the result of fear 
of the uncertainty regarding what change might bring about, that fear must 
be substantial and perhaps even irrational, because the current system is not 
only suboptimal in advancing the goals of detainees or the government, it is 
also woefully inadequate at providing certainty.  Consider some of the 
questions that have not been resolved as a matter of U.S. counterterrorism 
detention policy; these are questions which should represent a great deal of 
uncertainty for the government and for human rights groups, and will 
largely be resolved by judges, without any input from either interest group: 
69  What are the boundaries of the 
President’s detention power—that is, assuming that the government can 
prove that a detainee is who it claims him to be, what sort of person is it 
lawful to detain?70  “What sort of evidence can the government use?”71
 
65 Id. at 62. 
  
“How should the courts handle intelligence data or evidence that may have 
66 Id. 
67 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversing decision below 
and dismissing habeas petitions by detainees in Afghanistan, stating: “Upon review, and 
applying the Supreme Court decision in Boumediene, we determine that the district court did 
not have jurisdiction to consider the petitions for habeas corpus. We therefore reverse the 
order of the district court and order that the petitions be dismissed.”). 
68 WITTES, supra note 5, at 63. 
69 Id. at 64. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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been given involuntarily?”72  Who is the “class of people subject to 
noncriminal detention”?  Is it al Qaeda?  The Taliban?  Associated Forces?  
Supporters or substantial supporters?  Functional members?  Those falling 
under the command structure of the enemy organization?  Those who 
provided independent support?  Those who must be detained to prevent 
them from returning to the battlefield?  Those who are likely to rejoin the 
enemy or pose a current threat?73
If membership is what counts for detention, when does membership 
end?  If one is once a member are they always a member, and therefore 
always detainable?  If the relationship can be vitiated, what does it take to 
vitiate it and who bears the burden of proving vitiation?
 
74  Does acting as a 
cooperating witness on behalf of the government count, or does it only 
matter if the detainee was a member of the enemy organization at the time 
of capture?75  Must there be evidence of affirmative disassociation or 
merely expulsion from the organization?76  Does evidence have a half-life 
such that “evidence that would suffice to justify detention at an earlier stage 
no longer suffices at the point of habeas review?” Or vice versa, does the 
“standard that the judges apply in habeas review theoretically apply at the 
point that the government acquires custody?”77  These are just some of the 
open questions in counterterrorism detentions, illustrating the uncertainty of 
current policies it seems that—in counterterrorism detention policy, 
uncertainty abounds.78
 
72 Id. at 65. 
  
73 Id. at 68–69. 
74 Id. at 70. 
75 Id. at 73. 
76 Id. at 75. 
77 Id. at 70. 
78 Other questions include: How should hearsay be treated?  Are “intelligence reports 
that record or summarize information provided by various sources; records and summaries of 
statements made by detainees during interrogation; and transcripts and summaries of 
statements made by detainees when appearing before [various administrative panels] 
admissible and probative?”  
 Is “reliability a necessary condition for admissibility or simply a critical factor in 
assessing the weight to be given to the evidence?”  Id. at 76.  “[W]hen is an interrogation 
sufficiently coercive to require either exclusion of a resulting statement from evidence or a 
significant diminution of the weight it is accorded?”  Id. at 77.  What interrogation methods 
will or will not produce admissible statements and how long and under what circumstances 
will the taint of coercive interrogations persist?  Id. at 81.   “Should allegations made by the 
government be treated as elements of a criminal offense, whereby a failure to prove one 
element means a failure of proof overall?”  Id. at 81.  Or should the court “take a more 
impressionistic view of the overall picture, using what the intelligence community calls the 
‘mosaic theory’ of evidence?”  Id. at 81.  
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The goal in recanting these questions first raised by Wittes and 
developed in much greater detail in Detention and Denial is to note the 
uncertainty that is already present in U.S. counterterrorism detention 
policy.  Advocates who claim that they fear changing the status quo due to 
the uncertainty of what might result, fail to recognize that the current 
system is wrought with uncertainties—yet still the status quo endures.  
C. REASONS FOR POLICY DISARRAY AND THE STRENGTH OF THE 
STATUS QUO 
U.S. counterterrorism detention policy is in disarray and the costs of 
this disarray have been hidden through a series of policy work-arounds that 
Wittes described as “shame, denial, and obfuscation.”79  The U.S. detains 
suspected terrorists only when necessary and generally avoids that necessity 
by killing people (think unmanned aerial vehicles like Predator drones) or 
letting them go80 (“catch and release”).  When it is necessary to detain 
people, some of those detainees are prosecuted in federal courts, while 
others are held in theater internment facilities run by nations willing to do 
the dirty work of the U.S.81  This policy has moral costs, security costs, and 
rights costs, and has created a system that is costly in the short-run and 
unsustainable in the long-run.82
In light of these costs, how can the status quo endure?  It is not for a 
lack of ideas and proposed reforms.  In fact, Detention and Denial is an 
example of a comprehensive retrospective review of U.S. counterterrorism 
detention policy, and a prospective template for reform.  Much like Wittes’s 





79 WITTES, supra note 
  If only this were enough to bring about policy 
change.  Unfortunately, in Washington, D.C., lots of great ideas compete 
for policy attention and only an appropriate alignment of events and 
interests can provide the window for policy change.  Wittes, a veteran D.C. 
policy watcher, knows this and acknowledges as much when he writes, “I 
recognize that if our paralysis is as complete as I suggest, the book 
5, at 5. 
80 Id. at 5. 
81 Id. at 3–6; see Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 
(Jan. 22, 2009). 
82 Id. at 126.   
83 See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR (2008); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, 
The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 
893 (2009) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR (2008)); Curtis A. 
Bradley, Terror and the Law: The Limits of Judicial Reasoning in the Post-9/11 World, 
FOREIGN AFF., July 1, 2008, at 132; Gregory S. McNeal, Please the Courts: Can Judges and 
Juries Win the War on Terror?, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 11, 2008, at 44. 
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necessarily takes on something of the quality of an academic exercise—the 
crafting of a policy strategy for a country that prefers not to have a 
policy.”84  Indeed, the country may prefer no policy today, but someday the 
U.S. may need to craft one, and when that day comes, Wittes’s work will be 
a starting point for reform.  However, we should ask ourselves whether 
reform is even possible?  Perhaps instead we should be pessimistic, seeing 
the country that, in Wittes’s words, “prefers not to have a policy?”85  The 
policy paralysis associated with the status quo is, as I highlighted above, 
emboldened by limitless arguments for and against the current system.86
serves nobody.  It does not serve the military or any other component of the U.S. 
government that has to operate overseas.  The system’s random operations make a 
mockery of the human rights concerns that gave rise to the very spotty judicialization 
of detention to date.  Our current system is one whose parts interact in ridiculous and 
ill-considered ways that create absurd and perverse incentives.  It is a system that no 
rational combination of values or strategic considerations would have produced; it 
could have emerged only as a consequence of a clash of interests that produced a clear 
victory for nobody.  The result is that it reflects no coherent policy choices . . .  we 




What might that peril be?  Both the Obama and Bush Administrations 
released dangerous detainees, including suicide bombers and terrorist 
leaders.
 
88  Of course, both Administrations also released people whom they 
admitted were not properly detained in the first place.89
 
84 Wittes, supra note 
  It seems that peril 
and paralysis are linked concepts—the peril of continuing to hold an 
innocent person sits in equipoise with the peril of a recidivist detainee 
harming someone—both are plausible examples of harm that policy 
advocates can raise—and the elevation of such claims could reinforce 
5, at 10. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 13: 
By the end of Barack Obama’s first year in office, the new president’s promise to close 
Guantanamo had become an albatross around his neck. . . .  [T]he project itself had become 
controversial, with Republicans discovering an ideological commitment to Guantanamo and 
rallying behind it.  Magnifying the ranks of the opposition was NIMBYism in Congress, where 
many members felt far less strongly about the underlying issues associated with detention than 
about the need to make sure that detainees came nowhere near their districts. 
87 Id. at 12. 
88 Id. at 2; see also Thomas Joscelyn, Gitmo Recidivism Rate Soars, WKLY. STANDARD 
(Dec. 7, 2010, 4:12 PM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/gitmo-recidivism-rate-
soars_521965.html; McNeal, supra note 83, at 44. 
89 Director of Nat’l Intelligence, Summary of Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held 
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (2010), available at http://www.dni.gov/
electronic_reading_room/120710_Summary_of_the_Reengagement_of_Detainees_Formerly
_Held_at_Guantanamo_Bay_Cuba.pdf.  
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paralysis and a bias towards the status quo.  When coupled with obfuscation 
of policy failures, hiding of policy costs, and denial of policy problems, the 
status quo becomes a powerful force.90
Of course, the power of the status quo that Wittes describes is 
emblematic of the status quo bias in nearly every area of American 
politics.
 
91  In these cases, a clash of interests produces a suboptimal policy 
outcome that some might describe as a compromise, but none would 
describe as a victory.  What makes U.S. counterterrorism detention policy 
any different?  Most groups involved in debates over detention policy 
recognize the problems with the status quo, but are unable or unwilling to 
advocate for change.  Wittes argues that civil liberties and human rights 
activists have made a tactical judgment that the status quo is preferable to 
the uncertainty they may face if the United States decides to pass legislation 
governing counterterrorism detentions;92 while government lawyers and 
members of the Bush Administration echoed these precautionary 
sentiments.93
The preference that groups may hold for the certain (albeit suboptimal) 
present over the uncertainty of change is not a concept unique to U.S. 
counterterrorism detention policy; rather, this preference is a regular facet 
of American political life.
 
94  Wittes’s helpful contribution is his argument 
not only that U.S. policy is suboptimal, but also that it is incomplete, and 
therefore the status quo is uncertain for all and reform can remedy this 
uncertainty problem.95  According to Wittes, there are entire areas of 
detention policy where the political branches have refused to craft rules 
with any degree of specificity; thus, in a crisis situation “we live with the 
uncertainty of not having any [rules] and fall back on whatever ill-fitting 
legal architecture makes itself available.”96
 
90 See generally WITTES, supra note 
  That uncertainty can’t serve 
any side in the debate, and thus it provides an opportunity for policy 
change. 
5, at 15, 28–30. 
91 See generally BAUMGARTNER ET. AL., supra note 50; THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AFTER 
DISASTER: AGENDA SETTING, PUBLIC POLICY, AND FOCUSING EVENTS (1997); DEBORAH 
STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING (2d ed. 1997). 
92 WITTES, supra note 5, at 111. 
93 Id.; see Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 
U. RICH. L. REV. 967, 992 (2009) (quoting JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW 
AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 124–25 (2007)). 
94 See generally BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 50; BIRKLAND, supra note 91; JOHN 
W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); STONE, supra note 91. 
95 See WITTES, supra note 5, at 94. 
96 Id. 
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D. POWER POLITICS OVER POLICY? 
If human rights groups and government attorneys admit that the 
current system of detention is suboptimal, but argue against change because 
they fear the uncertainty of what legislation might bring,97
How is it possible that the government and rights groups both prefer 
the current system?  After all, as described by Wittes, this is a system that 
does not serve the goals of either group, does not provide certainty 
regarding process or outcome, and forecloses the ability to influence and 
lobby about the development of that uncertain future.  Something else must 
account for the status quo bias.  One plausible explanation for this status 
quo bias is that political actors in general and executive branch actors in 
particular will tolerate the current system until such time as they must 
change the system.  This perspective is best represented by the approach 
followed by the Bush Administration during its entire tenure.  Jack 
Goldsmith describes how David Addington, legal counsel to Vice President 
Cheney, repeatedly dismissed any advice that sought to garner the support 
of Congress in the process of policy change.
 that suggests that 
there must be adequate certainty within the current system.  However, in 
light of Wittes’s litany of open and uncertain substantive and procedural 
questions, one has to wonder if more than just fear of uncertainty is 
animating the status quo bias.   
98  Addington believed that the 
risks of a diminishment in presidential power were too high if the Executive 
Branch approached the Legislative Branch and was rebuffed.  Thus, in his 
view, if a policy could be justified “on the President’s sole authority,” and 
going to Congress might limit that authority, any policy change beyond the 
status quo (which was an executive-controlled policy equilibrium) was 
something the Administration should not seek.99  As a result of this 
resistance to change, the Administration followed a unilateral approach, 
which only yielded to outside pressure for change when faced with formal 
mandates such as Supreme Court review.100
 
97 Id. at 111. 
  The consequential long-term 
undermining of policy effectiveness was left for later, to be dealt with in 
98 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 124–25 (2007); see also id. at 76–77 (describing Addington’s relationship 
with Vice President Cheney). 
99 Id. at 124 (describing the governing legal questions advanced by Addington “whenever 
someone proposed that the White House work with Congress to clear away a legal restriction 
or to get the legislature on board: ‘Do we have the legal power to do it [on the President’s 
sole authority]?’ and ‘Might Congress limit our options in ways that jeopardize American 
lives?’”). 
100 See id. at 125 (“Whenever the Supreme Court threatened to review one of the 
administration’s terrorism policies, Paul Clement was able to eke out small concessions from 
the White House.”); see also McNeal, supra note 93. 
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Addington’s words, “when and if it is necessary to do so.”101
A more cynical explanation may be that for interest groups, 
counterterrorism detention policy is more about politics than policy.  For 
example, some commentators have claimed that it is politically unrealistic 
to consider prosecuting President Obama and other senior Administration 
officials for their counterterrorism policies, yet they believe that it is 
appropriate to perhaps prosecute officials at some future point in time.
  “Do nothing 
until it is absolutely necessary to do something” seems to be an acceptable 
approach to some when it comes to counterterrorism detention policy. 
102  
Kenneth Anderson believes this suggests that the feasibility of 
accountability through prosecutions (the harshest form of opposition to 
status quo policies) is rooted in politics more than policy.  He writes, “If it 
is politically unrealistic to consider going after Barack Obama and Harold 
Koh and Leon Panetta and Joe Biden, et al., and that is the reason for not 
pursuing criminal sanctions that follow upon criminality, well, one has to 
wonder when it will be politically realistic?”103  His view is that opposition 
to current counterterrorism policies will likely be “politically realistic” 
when the administration in question is Republican rather than 
Democratic.104
 
101 Id. at 125–26 (explaining how Addington “focused on preventing an attack that day or 
that week, and not on what might happen next year or beyond”).  For a general discussion of 
this non-conformity approach and the legitimacy costs associated with it, see McNeal, supra 
note 
  Under this cynical worldview, the time for policy change 
93, at 992. 
102 See David Akerson & Natalie Knowlton, President Obama and the International 
Criminal Law of Successor Liability, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 615 (2009) (arguing that 
President Obama may be held liable for his failure to prosecute the Bush Administration for 
their war crimes); Benjamin Wittes, Is Barack Obama a Serial Killer?, LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 
2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/10/is-barack-obama-a-serial-killer/.  Wittes quotes 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, a law professor and expert for the ACLU and CCR who stated, in 
response to his query as to whether President Obama was a serial killer who should be 
prosecuted:  
We know that many countries have had their leadership commit very serious violations of 
international law with no accountability, the human rights community, international law 
community is committed to trying to change that, but we’ve had a setback over these last years 
and I don’t expect it to happen.  So I don’t see any real purpose in arguing about those matters.  
I’m interested in going forward and getting our country into compliance with international law, 
and we can talk about accountability later. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
103 Kenneth Anderson, The Mary Ellen O’Connell and Benjamin Wittes Debate on 




President Palin and Vice-President Jindal are at the helm, all of a sudden many people find the 
situation somehow . . . different.  It all seems so . . . criminal.  The alleged criminals all seem 
so . . . prosecutable or indictable, somewhere, somehow.  Despite angry assertions that the 
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will be shortly after the election of a president who is not ideologically 
aligned with human rights groups. 
E. QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY 
If, however, cynicism does not rule the day, and the issue is one of 
policy and not politics, perhaps the fundamental explanation for the lack of 
reform and preference for the status quo is that Wittes—who wants to make 
preventive detention a permanent feature of U.S. policy—believes that 
preventive detention is both legal and legitimate.105  Unfortunately, many 
outside the U.S. and many within rights groups may not subscribe to the 
legitimacy of detention.  In fact, no matter how persuasively Wittes makes 
the case that preventive detention has a long and legitimate pedigree (and I 
think he does make that case), his opponents may never be swayed.  
“Legitimacy,” say academics, “is a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.”106  In many policy domains, legitimacy flows from conformity 
with the practices of external “legitimacy providers.”107  To move from the 
status quo to Wittes’s preferred formalization of detention policy, and to do 
so in a way that would be deemed legitimate by human rights groups and 
allies abroad would require U.S. policy to conform to the standards in 
nations that do not practice preventive detention (because they view it as 
illegitimate).108
Herein lies the challenge for Wittes’s (and others) reform proposals—
the legitimacy that comes from conformity with the principles that are 
 
 
policies are identical, a wave of law scholars produce an endless number of scholarly tomes and 
declarations, promptly submitted by the ACLU and CCR to courts everywhere they can find as 
earnest amicus briefs, that it really is different.  It is very hard for me to see, as a pure political 
matter in the demimonde of the activist-scholar, international law advocacy community, that 
“politically realistic” is not simply another way of saying, “Republican administration.” 
Id. 
105 See WITTES, supra note 83, at 33–58 (including an entire chapter dedicated to 
explaining the reality and legality of preventive detention in the United States); see also 
Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice, 2 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85 (2011), available at http://www.harvardnsj.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Vol.-2_Klein-Wittes_Final-Published-Version.pdf.  
106 Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995) (noting that “over the years, social scientists have 
offered a number of definitions of legitimacy, with varying degrees of specificity,” some 
with evaluative and cognitive components); see McNeal, supra note 101. 
107 Ilídio Barreto & Charles Baden-Fuller, To Conform or to Perform? Mimetic 
Behaviour, Legitimacy-Based Groups and Performance Consequences, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 
1559, 1561 (2006). 
108 For a discussion of conformity based legitimacy, see McNeal, supra note 101. 
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palatable to human rights groups and Europeans will necessarily be in 
conflict with any preventive detention regime premised upon criminal law 
and human rights standards.  Wittes admits as much when he writes that 
there will be trade-offs and likely no win-wins.109
The American polity is not good at issues in which it is asked to make painful choices 
in the present by way of averting greater pain at some indeterminate point in the 
future.  Few societies are.  It is hard with respect to climate change and carbon 
emissions and with respect to national debt.  And it is even harder with respect to 
writing rules that allow the government to deprive of liberty people that we have not 
yet captured—people that, we can tell ourselves, do not exist and that we will 
therefore never capture.
  This is perhaps his most 
critical point—the status quo is unmovable absent a crisis, one that is far off 
and perhaps hard for policymakers and the electorate to comprehend.  He 
writes: 
110
In short, because new counterterrorism detention policies will be 
different from the current practices in place in other nations, a reform 
proposal cannot capture the attention of policymakers because almost any 
reform proposal will be seen as illegitimate by some.  It may maximize 
security, or certainty, or rights, but the biggest hurdle to overcome is not 
those values—the values Wittes’s proposals maximize—instead, the biggest 
hurdle is legitimacy, an amorphous value that is difficult to maximize 
absent conformity, and conformity is in the eye of the beholder 
 
The legitimacy challenges outlined above are further complicated by 
the fact that, most policy and political actors are not as rationally 
calculating as Wittes seems to hope.  Rather, they are satisficing, making 
incremental decisions based on limited data.111  The policy process, when 
understood this way, is not a rational comprehensive process that will 
generate the best policy outcome, but is rather a series of “successive 
limited comparisons” in which actors make choices about the status quo, 
and the feasible alternatives.112
 
109 See WITTES, supra note 
  In this framework, legitimacy is a key 
feasibility criterion, and perhaps the insurmountable obstacle facing reform 
minded advocates like Wittes. 
83, at 143. 
110 Id. 
111 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 118–20 (3d ed. 1976) (contrasting the 
economic and administrative approaches to uncertainty: “Whereas economic man 
supposedly maximizes—selects the best alternative from among all those available to him—
his cousin, the administrator, satisfices—looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or 
“good enough”).   
112 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 
(1959). 
880 GREGORY S. MCNEAL [Vol. 101 
Taken together, what lessons can we learn from Wittes?  His reform 
proposals are sensible, and as a normative matter, proper.  I agree with the 
underlying premise upon which his case for candor rests—that detention is 
a necessary tool of security with a long history in American law.113  I also 
agree with his contention that the U.S. should not put off change, shirking 
its responsibilities in the hope that new challenges won’t overwhelm the 
system.114
III. THE CASE FOR PESSIMISM 
  Nonetheless, as the preceding discussion highlights, reform 
advocates face significant challenges overcoming the bias towards the 
status quo.   
Despite my agreement with Wittes and other reformers, I believe a 
case for pessimism can and should be made, if for no other reason than to 
outline the major obstacles standing in the way of reform.  The story told 
thus far is one of a hyper-political discourse, coupled with a 
counterproductive detention policy that neither serves the interests of the 
government nor the interests of human rights.  Yet the policy endures.  
What accounts for the power of the status quo?  The durability may be a 
consequence of a failure on the part of the United States both to 
acknowledge that problems exist and conscious efforts to hide failures.  
This denial has proven itself as a flexible tool for managing detentions, that 
is, “[i]t has given the United States a relatively stable and reasonably 
favorable short-term equilibrium, one in which international pressure over 
detention matters has declined dramatically.”115  While effective in the short 
run, human rights and civil liberties activists on one side and government 
lawyers on the other side all seem to admit that a legislative policy fix 
would be preferable.116  Denial alone though, cannot explain the status quo 
because, to many advocates, the time to fix detention policy is now.117
A. THE POWER OF THE STATUS QUO 
  
Which raises the question, if the problems are as serious as some contend 
(and I believe they are), what explains the lack of change? 
Policy scholars have proven that the power of the status quo is a 
dominant feature in federal policymaking.118
 
113 See WITTES, supra note 
  One way to understand the 
5, at 33–58.  
114 See id. at 119. 
115 Id. at 109. 
116 Id. at 111 (“Many human rights and civil liberties activists, for example, acknowledge 
privately that in an ideal world the United States would treat these issues legislatively.”). 
117 See id. at 120. 
118 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 50, at 43 (“[F]or most issues most of the time, 
individual policy makers fight an uphill battle to reframe their issues.  One of the most 
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power of the status quo is to envision it as a consequence of friction in the 
policymaking process.  This friction prevents change from coming about, at 
least until the pressure for change overcomes the friction of the status 
quo.119  Wittes admits as much when he notes that change may be unlikely 
until the U.S. is engaged in a conflict that overwhelms the nation’s capacity 
to detain, either due to a mass influx of detainees or due to special 
categories of detainees whose intelligence value may be lost due to the 
inability of the U.S. to appropriately detain them.120
B. ATTENTION AND THE STATUS QUO 
  At that point we may 
see pressure for change (albeit late, and at some cost).  A way of 
understanding this in friction terms is to recognize that there is a constant 
undercurrent of pressure in favor of changing detention policy.  The effect 
of that pressure may be zero, until it crosses a threshold, and over that 
threshold we may witness a substantial amount of policy movement.  
However, short of sufficient political pressure—likely prompted by the dim 
future painted by Wittes—I fail to see how reforms in counterterrorism 
policy will come about. 
Part of the challenge in bringing about a change from the status quo is 
the ability to focus the attention of policymakers.121  This is not to say that 
attention to counterterrorism detention is nonexistent, rather attention to the 
problem seems to be constant, but so too is information in support of and 
opposed to current policies.  In Part II, I described how a hyper-partisan 
discourse surrounds counterterrorism detention policy debates, noting how 
arguments about Guantanamo specifically and counterterrorism detention 
policy generally, can lead to the status quo.  Similarly, Wittes notes that 
human rights groups from the left have demonized preventive detention 
while those on the right have made Guantanamo an ideological 
commitment and plank in their political platform.122
 
important reasons for this is that the issues are not new and the status quo policy was 
probably the result of substantial thought, deliberation, and compromise when it was 
adopted.”).  
  In this policy context 
it is difficult to focus the attention of policymakers, and persuasive 
arguments are not as new or persuasive as advocates may believe them to 
be.  As prominent policy scholars have noted, “the problem is rarely the 
119 Id. at 38.  
120 See WITTES, supra note 5, at 121, 136.  
121 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 50, at 246 (“Attention is perhaps the scarcest 
commodity in Washington, and from what we observed this makes good sense.  Information 
is freely flowing from policy advocates within well-organized professional communities and 
is widely available to any interested party.”). 
122 WITTES, supra note 5, at 13. 
882 GREGORY S. MCNEAL [Vol. 101 
scarcity of information, but rather its overabundance—policy makers don’t 
know how to make sense of it all, being overwhelmed with so much 
information coming at them from [interest groups] on all kinds of 
issues.”123  For detention policy, attention may be present but other 
priorities may seem more urgent.  As this Article was entering the editorial 
process, the healthcare debate,124 targeted killing and Predator drones in 
Libya,125 and WikiLeaks126 were the policy issues of the day, by the time 
this Article is in print, those issues will likely be replaced by more 
contemporary issues.  If the status quo is to be changed, serious attention 
must be focused on changing it, and that can only happen with a policy 
window akin to the future crisis Wittes describes, and even then policy 
leaders must be convinced that the status quo policy is seriously, not just 
marginally flawed.127
C. THE NEED TO JUSTIFY CHANGE 
 
As articulated above, those who want to change detention policy bear 
the burden of proof.  To move from the status quo, they must convince 
policymakers with limited attention that existing detention policy is so 
suboptimal that a new policy is justified.  This is a substantial challenge, not 
just because people naturally resist change, or because they prefer the 
substance of the status quo, but also because the status quo is 
understandable, it is manageable, and many may fear the uncertainty and 
unintended consequences of changing the system.128  To justify change, 
advocates must not only make the case to one policymaker or a handful of 
policymakers but must change the expectations and collective 
understandings of entire policy communities.129
In this context, it is important to ask who the constituency is for policy 
change.  In counterterrorism matters, there is an entire cottage industry of 
national security and human rights experts whose daily existence is justified 
and reinforced by the status quo.  For example, a central feature of the work 
 
 
123 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 50, at 246. 
124 Bill Mears, Supreme Court Won’t Jump into Health Care Fray—For Now,  
CNN (Apr. 25, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-25/justice/ 
scotus.healthcare.reform_1_appeals-court-affordable-care-act-health-care?_s=PM:CRIME. 
125 Martha Raddatz, Pentagon Confirms First Predator Drone Strike in Libya, ABC 
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/pentagon-confirms-predator-
drone-strike-libya/story?id=13442570. 
126 The Guantanamo Papers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 24, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/series/135694663/the-guantanamo-papers. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 42. 
129 Id. at 250. 
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the American Civil Liberties Union,130 Center for Constitutional Rights,131 
Human Rights Watch,132 Human Rights First,133 Amnesty International,134 
and dozens of other groups is opposition to current detention policies.  But 
unlike a traditional lobby, what constituency do these groups represent?  
More pointedly, are the mistakes in detention policy important enough for 
any individual member of Congress to take steps to change the policy?  
Will a member lose their seat over a failure to provide greater due process 
protections to detainees?  Or is it more likely that they will lose their seat if 
they champion the cause of detainees and one of those detainees is released 
and kills some of his constituents?  That is the political calculus facing 
policymakers, and in that calculus it seems difficult to justify changing 
detention policy absent some clear benefit to national security.  Moreover, 
even if individual policymakers agree that the policy should be changed, 
they may face substantial hurdles in their attempts to convince 
Congressional leaders (who drive the legislative agenda) that the policy 
should be overhauled.135
 
130 Illegal Detentions in the War on Terror, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/
indefinitedetention/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (dedicating an entire special webpage to the 
topic of counterterrorism detention). 
  The power of the status quo is substantial and 
perhaps one of its most enduring features is the ability to “kick the can 
down the road.”  As policy scholars have noted, “[t]he most important 
reason for the endurance of the status quo is that power is divided within 
131 Illegal Detentions and Guantanamo, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
http://ccrjustice.org/illegal-detentions-and-guantanamo (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (listing 
detention and Guantanamo as an issue in which “the CCR has led the legal battle over 
Guantanamo for over eight years”). 
132 Guantanamo, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/en/category/topic/
counterterrorism/guantanamo (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (dedicating a section of their 
webpage to the topic of Guantanamo and counterterrorism detention). 
133 The Case to Close Guantanamo, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/closegitmo/about/ (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2011) (featuring a petition and a section of their website dedicated to closing 
Guantanamo and claiming that “Guantanamo continues to be Al Qaeda’s top recruiting 
too”).  
134 Guantanamo and Illegal U.S. Detentions, AMNESTY INT’L, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/counter-terror-withjustice/guantanamo/page.do?id=1351079 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (featuring a section of their webpage dedicated to bringing about 
an end to counterterrorism detention and Guantanamo). 
135 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 50, at 43.  
Even if policy makers recognize that the policy is imperfect or the result of an error . . .  it may 
still be a hard sell to convince others, especially those in leadership positions, that the current 
policy is working so badly that it must be overhauled.  This threshold effect means that the vast 
majority of policies do not change at all. . . .  Yet for most issues most of the time, individual 
policy makers fight an uphill battle to reframe their issues. 
Id. 
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the American system and attention is limited.  Because power is 
fragmented, many political actors must come together if policy change is to 
be made.”136
IV. CONCLUSION 
  If the politics since September 11, 2001 are an indication, the 
prospects for groups to come together on counterterrorism policy and 
justify change to policymakers are fairly dim. 
Taken together, the factors discussed above highlight how 
counterterrorism detention policy is biased towards the status quo due to an 
information-induced equilibrium which has created a context in which the 
costs of reform exceed the benefits of the status quo.  The status quo is 
reinforced by the need to justify changes, the lack of focused attention to 
detention policy, and a hyper-politicized policy context in which change 
seems impossible.   
Both sides in the counterterrorism debate are adequately informed 
about the defects in the current system and the ways to remedy those 
defects, yet they are unwilling to work for policy reform.  The reasons for 
this are in part systemic and in part structural.  Another reason is that the 
power of the status quo when balanced against the uncertainty of change is 
a powerful force in policy development.  Moreover, the lack of a natural 
constituency for policy change means that reform proposals do not have an 
advocate willing to make the case to other policy leaders.  These defects 
should suggest pessimism regarding the prospects for reform of 
counterterrorism detention policy. 
 
136 Id. at 43–44. 
